Vulf Plotkin

© Vulf Plotkin


Recurrent geopolitical patterns: the Grand Chessboard
and its no less grand, albeit smaller precursor

The Eurasian continent, which Zbigniew Brzezinski dubbed “The Grand Chessboard” in his book under the identical title with a telling subtitle (The grand chessboard: American primacy and its geostrategic imperatives. Basic Books, New York, 1997), was divided by the eminent grandmaster of geopolitics into four regions, which he designated as “West”, “East”, “Middle Space” and “South” (see Map IX in that book).

Each of the first three regions is occupied by a major player on the Eurasian chessboard – Europe, China and Russia respectively, while “South”, which embraces the Middle East with the adjacent countries of former Soviet Central Asia and the Caucasus, houses no states powerful enough to be major actors on the continental chessboard. That region is therefore a favourite playing field not only for the three Eurasian powers, but also for an actor from another continent – obviously the USA.

Is the above geopolitical disposition unique, peculiar to the Eurasian continent at the turn of the millennium, or could perhaps similar dispositions be found in the past on other geopolitical arenas? In the latter case it would be useful to create a schematic model for that recurrent disposition. Let us therefore consider a hypothetical continent occupied by three states known as “Westland”, “Midland” and “Eastland”, and a fourth state called “Sealand” on an adjacent island. Like any workable model, this scheme must serve to formulate the most likely geostrategic motivations, goals and imperatives that guide the behaviour of the four powers with regard to one another.

Faced with potential adversaries on both sides, “Midland” is motivated to build up its military might for warfare on two fronts, thus becoming stronger than either of its neighbours. Worried by this, “Westland” and “Eastland” are likely to form an alliance. The mutual suspicions of “Midland” on the one hand and its neighbours on the other will feed a vicious circle, leading to an escalation of fear and militarization in all the three continental powers. The most likely war pattern in regions with such a geopolitical structure can be formulated as “Westland and Eastland vs. Midland”, though alliances are also known between “Midland” and one of its neighbours against the other.

“Sealand” feels secure as long as the continent is not dominated by any of the three, hence its typical geostrategic course is to deny conclusive victory to any power on the continent by supporting the weaker side in conflicts between the continental powers. “Sealand” can thereby seriously affect the geopolitical situation in the region, but unlike the three other powers, which may strive for domination over the entire continent and occasionally achieve it for some time, it is practically impossible for maritime “Sealand” to dominate the continent. The realistic objective for it is to secure a few footholds on the continent.

The above model apparently fits the geopolitical disposition which was operative in Europe from the 18th century till the 1940s, with France as “Westland”, Russia as “Eastland”, Germany (alias Prussia) as “Midland”, and Britain as “Sealand”. This is, of course, a barebones abstraction from a host of historical and geographical details pertaining to dozens of lesser players. Nevertheless, instructive parallels can also be found between the roles of, say, Italy and India as local players in the South of both arenas, or of the Middle East and the Balkans as playing grounds for the four major actors.

The geopolitical disposition described above took shape in Europe in the first half of the 18th century with the emergence of Prussia and Russia as new powers. In accordance with the most likely geostrategic pattern France and Russia united in the Seven Years' War (1756-63)  against Prussia, which, being the weaker side, was supported by Britain. In the wars of 1792-1815 Britain, in order to prevent France from becoming the dominant power on the continent, supported both Prussia and Russia as the targets of French expansion. As the might of Germany grew after its unification in 1871, France and Russia again joined forces against Germany, this time with Britain on their side. That was the geopolitical background for the outbreak of the war in 1914, which started as a European conflict, but widened to global scale towards the end.

Two events in the course of the 1914-18 war radically changed its initial geopolitical disposition – Russia was defeated by Germany and dropped out of the alliance, and the USA replaced it as an ally to Britain and France. As a result the war ended with no real victors among the four initial belligerents, because one of the allies on the winning side had lost the war, and because France and Britain owed much of their victory to the USA. This outcome of the war had catastrophic geopolitical consequences, aggravated by the refusal of the USA to assume a permanent role on the European chessboard. That created a geopolitical vacuum in Europe with no powers left capable of maintaining a credible balance of forces in the region. On territories lost by Germany and Russia several new states were established, forming a wide belt between those two routed adversaries. The weak fledgling polities were naturally apprehensive of the inevitable irredentist designs by their once powerful neighbours on both sides, but France and Britain, to whom they could only turn for protection, were not up to the task. As Germany and Russia, actively supporting one another, restored and considerably enhanced their capacities for revenge by the mid-1930s, the stage was set for a new war, in the course of which three different geopolitical patterns were realized in succession.

In the first stage of WWII (Sept. 1939 – June 1941) the pattern looked to many like “Midland and Eastland” against “Westland and Sealand”. But the former alliance was predictably short-lived and limited in its objectives to the dismantling of the newly created states between Germany and Russia. It was never intended to fight together against France and Britain, because nazi Germany and bolshevik Russia were in fact geostrategic rivals, each striving for domination over Europe. After Germany had routed France and gained practically full control over continental Europe, with Britain left as the last obstacle to Germany's objective, the geopolitically inherent antagonism between Germany and Russia came to a head in June 1941. That marked the end of the first stage and the transition to the geopolitical pattern of “Sealand and Eastland” against “Midland”.

Yet the second stage was of short duration. In December 1941 the war was joined by two non-European powers, thus becoming a truly global conflict. The final third stage of the war was fought on a different, much larger geopolitical arena, with domination not just over Europe, but over Eurasia now at stake. Since that turning point the war game was played on two chessboards simultaneously – in Europe and in the Asian-Pacific region, which did not for the duration of the war merge into a single Eurasian chessboard.

Perhaps the most significant outcome of WWII was the drastically curtailed roster of active geopolitical players on the nascent Eurasian chessboard, as Germany, France and Britain in Europe, Japan in the Asian-Pacific region lost this status. In fact only Russia and the USA emerged as great powers, immediately starting their contest for domination on the new chessboard. Soon, however, they were joined by a third player – China, after which the geopolitical disposition on the Eurasian chessboard began to resemble the classical pattern: Russia was now “Midland”, allied with China (now ”Eastland”) against the alliance of “Westland” (Europe) with the USA as “Sealand”. The resemblance with the situation in Europe on the eve of WWII looks even more striking on the map: just like the temporarily allied Germany and Russia controlled practically all of continental Europe between June 1940 and June 1941, with Britain standing alone, the new Russian-Chinese alliance held under its sway most of Eurasia in the 1950s, while “Sealand”, now the USA, strove to retain a chain of footholds circling the rims of the continent from Norway to Japan in an arc via the Middle East and South-East Asia.

When the alliance between Russia and China predictably broke up in the 1960s, the geopolitical chart of the Eurasian chessboard reversed to the classical pattern: Russia as “Midland”, feeling encompassed and threatened by enemies on all sides, behaved accordingly, that is, aggressively, while China and Europe were concerned about their security in the face of Russia's formidable power and expansionist inclinations. Although only Europe sought protection in a bloc with the USA, while China did not enter into alliances with the USA and/or Western Europe, Russia confronted all the three other major players on the chessboard. The burden, however, proved too heavy for Russia and brought about the collapse of its empire in the early 1990s.

Speaking in broad terms, the break-up of the Russian empire did not fundamentally change the Eurasian geopolitical pattern with its four major players, since Russia in its somewhat narrower borders remains one of them, the relations between the other three players are basically unchanged, and no new player has yet appeared on the chessboard. True, the continental balance of power has shifted radically with Russia's military might and stature significantly shrunk. Since, however, a shift like that is not irreversible, the continent might be expected to be taken back to the disposition of the 70s and 80s, if and when Russia succeeds in restoring its might.

In that hypothetical case the most plausible geostrategic scenario would see an irredentist Russia confronting Europe and China, which would inevitably join forces to contain the resurrected ”Midland”. The USA cannot be expected to stay out of the conflict and in accordance with its overriding geostrategic imperative would in all probability choose to help Russia as the weaker side. Indeed, there have lately been indications that this scenario, however improbable it might seem at present, is not completely dismissed by at least some of the four powers.

Yet the crucial question for the world in the 21st century is whether the classical geopolitical disposition, which was operative for three centuries on the smaller European chessboard and then for several decades on the larger Eurasian arena, can be revived amid the new realities.

As is well known, the determinant factor in geopolitics is the nature of the weaponry used in warfare, primarily its destructive power and range. Both have increased spectacularly since WWII, with two epoch-making consequences that have brought about a radical change in geostrategic thinking and behaviour.

First, the power and range of the new weaponry have reached a level that makes its actual use in warfare suicidal for both adversaries and thus calls in question the very notion of meaningful victory in a war waged with sophisticated arms. Hence the reluctance of the major powers in the past decades to wage wars directly against one another and their preference for wars by proxy fought with less formidable weaponry. This, however, has exacted a price from the major powers – there has been a shift of balance within blocs led by them in favour of the client states, some of which gained weight at the expense of their patrons by becoming indispensable as proxies, with some simply refusing to serve in that role. The far-reaching consequences of such shifts can be seen in the disintegration of the CENTO, SEATO and Warsaw blocs, as well as the growing disunity in NATO.

Second, there has been a flip side to the enhanced potential for warfare resulting from the advancements in armaments – a concomitant increase in the power and range of weapons that can inadvertently become available to individual combatants or various military formations not controlled by states. This circumstance has put into doubt the age-old wisdom of territorial aggrandizement as the most valuable prize of war, and governments began to discover the futility of occupying and retaining land inhabited by a recalcitrant populace. The different policies of Britain after WWI and WWII are a case in point:  new territories were added to the British empire in the aftermath of the former, but soon after the end of WWII the empire began to be dismantled. The other colonial powers followed suit, however hesitantly at times.

As warfare became so less rewarding and so more disastrous, the three major Eurasian powers – Europe, Russia and China – adopted in practice a new geostrategic course of avoiding wars between global powers. For the first time in history a de facto peace belt has taken shape in Eurasia, spanning the entire length of the continent from the English Channel to the East China Sea. That does not, of course, disregard the recent wars (hopefully the last in Europe) in disintegrating Yugoslavia or the use of force by Russia in Chechnya and by China in Tibet and Uighuristan. Neither does it ignore the numerous causes for friction between the three nations. But the realization that war against an adversary of comparable power is to be avoided is a gigantic step towards global peace.

The decisive point for Eurasian and indeed global geopolitics in this century is how the fourth power, the USA, will respond to the new disposition on the Grand Chessboard. On the one hand, it seems to share the resolve of its three continental counterparts to avoid warfare between the four. Unlike the other three, however, the USA has explicitly threatened to use armed force against any state that might try to attain a military potential equal to that of the USA, in fact arrogating to itself the status of uncontestable global overlord. This makes peace between the USA and its three Eurasian counterparts conditional on the latter acquiescing in the establishment of global Pax Americana. The enormous gap between the colossal military might of the USA and the potentials of the three continental powers ensures that for the time being the latter will have to be circumspect in their response to the American challenge, so that military confrontation on that account does not loom on the horizon. But this also means that the three major constituents of the above-described Eurasian peace belt do not have to fear the overwhelming force of the USA and feel free to challenge the superpower in any way, except by arms.

Warfare has never been the only factor in geopolitics, and other factors, primarily political and economic influence, are now coming to the fore as the danger of wars between the major powers has been practically eliminated for the foreseeable future. The decisive geopolitical contest of this century will focus on dominance over the Eurasian continent – on whether it will fall under the sway of a single power, and if so, which of them. Considering the ever more evident ineffectiveness of military conquest and rule, political and economic tools rather than warfare are likely to determine the course and outcome of the contest.

None of the three major Eurasian powers has so far shown any inclination to dominate the whole of the continent, focusing instead on the pursuit of regional objectives. The Pax Americana project thus leaves the USA as the sole claimant for victory in the contest on the Grand Chessboard, while the three other contestants will undoubtedly try to frustrate the ambitious project.

It was suggested above in discussing the likely geopolitical objectives of the players in the abstract model that the goal of dominating the entire continent, hardly feasible for the three continental powers, is unattainable for the maritime ”Sealand”. Indeed, the attempts by Napoleon's France, Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Russia signally failed, while Britain has never seriously vied for domination over Europe. What is then the realistic motivation behind the present-day American geostrategy and what are its goals?

To begin with, no less than two thirds of Eurasia, both in area and in population, are beyond the range of conceivable American control. That includes the territories of the European Union, Russia and China, on which the USA can certainly exert some influence, but domination is out of the question. This also refers to some countries adjacent to the three major powers and subject to their regional influence, as well as to states aspiring to join the ranks of the major powers, first and foremost India. What remains as the realistic prize in the contest on the Grand Chessboard is domination over only about a quarter of Eurasia designated as “South” by Z. Brzezinski, namely the Middle East.

Since the main geostrategic objective of maritime “Sealand” in accordance with the above model is to gain and retain footholds on the continent, domination over the Middle East is of paramount importance to the USA. A lot has been said in the recent years and months about the rationale of the American version of what was known in another epoch as Drang nach Osten. Explanations have been sought in ideology (a clash of civilizations) or in economy (a scramble for oil). But the stakes appear to be much higher, because the USA is not seriously imperilled ideologically or economically, whereas failure to retain control over the Middle East would in effect mean the removal of the USA from the Grand Chessboard and loss of influence on the Eurasian continent.

It is worth remembering that for most of its history the USA avoided overseas involvement, and even after such involvement did take place in WWI, its post-war continuation was rejected. For more than a century since the Monroe doctrine the USA was content with its status of the hemispheric power. What was the most decisive factor in the geopolitical U-turn from isolationism to interventionism, from hemispheric to global dominance?

The fertile ground for this change of geopolitical direction was apparently provided by the major Eurasian powers, which spent (or rather wasted) half of the past century in two orgies of suicidal mutual bloodletting, from which they had to be saved by the intervention of the USA. The latter thus became the saviour, protector and arbiter of peace on the continent, which gave the USA immense geopolitical clout as well as considerable economic gains. By the close of the century, however, that role of the USA had come to an end as the three Eurasian powers saw the light at last and decided to stop the mutual self-destruction in wars between themselves. To put it in a nutshell, most of Eurasia no longer feels a need for American patronage, so that the USA faces a return to its erstwhile status of hemispheric power – a prospect it regards as catastrophic demotion. Despite the proclaimed readiness to “go it alone”, unilateralism is quite practical for the USA only in the conduct of warfare, but in the much more essential political and economic spheres it is self-defeating, and in these spheres the USA needs cooperation with Eurasia at least as much as, perhaps even more than Eurasia needs partnership with the USA.

The present geopolitical course of the USA aims at averting such an eventuality and retaining the largest possible foothold on the Eurasian continent. The consequences of failure to attain this objective have been discussed above. If, however, the USA succeeds in remaining a powerful player on the Grand Chessboard, it will face a fateful choice between two geostrategic courses. One of them – the multilateralist course – will see the USA as an equal partner in a broad coalition of the major Eurasian powers controlling the continent; the other – the unilateralist course – will urge the USA to arrogate to itself the commanding role of supreme arbiter on the continent. The latter alternative will in all probability be repulsed either by all the major Eurasian powers or by some of them, and then the entire world will face a choice between two equally apocalyptic scenarios: a clash either between united Eurasia and the USA, or between two Eurasian camps, one of which will be allied with the USA. The outcome of these so far hypothetical, yet not improbable eventualities is too horrendous to contemplate.

April  2003.